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EXTENT OF JUDICIAL POWER-INTERFERENCE WITH EXECUTIVE
POWER.
The decision in the recent case of La Abra Silver Mining Com-
pany v. United States, 2o Sup.Ct. Rep. 168, finally determines a ques-
tion which has been the source of no little diplomatic correspond-
ence between the executive and legislative departments of our gov-
ernment during the past quarter of the century, and presenting one
of the most outrageous claims ever worked through Congress.
The questions involved in this case arose from a claim made by
the La Abra Silver Mining Company, a New York corporation, for
damages alleged to have been sustained in consequence of certain
acts and omissions of duty upon the part of official representatives
of the Republic of Mexico. Pursuant to a convention between the
United States and the Republic of Mexico, concluded in 1868, this
claim was submitted to a commission of two for investigation.
They, failing to agree, appointed an umpire, as provided by the
terms of this convention, who made an award of close on to
seven hundred thousand dollars in favor of the mining company.
An application was made to the umpire by the Government of
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Mexico for a rehearing of the case, but it was denied. Subse-
quently, the Mexican Government, without at all disputing its
obligations under the convention of i868-making such an award
final-placed in the possession of the Secretary of State of the
United States, certain books, documents and papers which it al-
leged had been then recently discovered and would show that the
La Abra Company was not only fictitious and fraudulent, but had
been supported by false and perjured testimony. At that time a
large part of the sum awarded to the company had been paid by
Mexico and was in the hands of the Secretary of State.
The President being of opinion that certain legislation was
necessary as to the manner of making payments to the individual
claimants, the matter was submitted to Congress. An act was
passed, one portion of which directed the President to investigate
the charges of fraud, and empowered him to withhold the funds,
should he be of the opinion that the case ought to be retired. The
Secretary of State subsequently made an investigation, and, after a
thorough examination of the newly-discovered evidence, reported to
the President that, "while the nature of the case did not justify or
demand a retrial of the claims by a new international tribunal, the
honor of the United States required that the case should be further
investigated by the United Stateg to ascertain whether this govern-
ment had been made the means of enforcing against a friendly
power claims of our citizens based upon or exaggerated by fraud;
that if further investigation should remove the doubts, the honor of
the United States would have been completely maintained, but if,
on the other hand, the claimant should fail in removing these
doubts, or if they should be replaced by certain condemnation, the
honor of the United States would be vindicated by such measures
as might then be dictated; and that as the Executive had not the
means of instituting and pursuing the investigation, the subject
should be referred to Congress for its action." Congress failed to
make any provision, and after it adjourned in the summer of i88o,
payment to the La Abra claimant of the installments received
from Mexico, were begun by Executive order. This proceeded un-
til the Arthur Administration, at which time further distribution
was suspended because of the negotiation of a treaty between the
United States and Mexico for a re-examination of the case. This
treaty was signed in i882 and was submitted to the Senate for its
approval, but was rejected by that body. While this treaty was
before the Senate mandamus proceedings were brought to compel
the Secretary of State to distribute the installments which had been
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withheld. The suit went to the Supreme Court on appeal and was
dismissed by that tribunal. Frelinghuysen v. Key, Iio U. S. 63.
After the rejection of the treaty, and after repeated recommenda-
tions to Congress by the Executive Department, an act was finally
passed in 1892 conferring full jurisdiction over the matter upon the
Court of Claims, with right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States, and authorizing the Attorney-General to bring suits
in the name of the United States to determine whether the original
award was obtained by fraud. The La Abra Company demurred
to the bill brought for this purpose, the main ground being that
the questions involved were of a diplomatic or political nature, and.
that under the Constitution of the United States the subject-matter
of this suit was within the final and exclusive control of the Execu-
tive Department of the government and not within the jurisdiction
of any judicial tribunal.
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution provides for the ex-
tent of the judicial power, and declares that the same shall extend
to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the
laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority, etc. This article confines the judicial power
to a "case in law or equity," in which a right under such law is
asserted in a court of justice. If the question cannot be brought
into a court, then there is no case in law or equity, and no jurisdic-
tion is given in the Constitution.
Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat
264 declared a suit to be the prosecution by a party of some claim,
demand, or request.in a court of justice for the purpose of being
put in possession of a right claimed by him and of which he is de-
prived. It is also decided in this case that if, in any controversy
depending in a court, the cause should depend on the validity of a
law, that would be a case arising under the Constitution, to which
the judicial power of the United States would extend. In the case
of Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat 738, in referring to the
judicial power, the court says, "This clause enables the judicial de-
partment to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the Constitu-
tion, laws, and treaties of the United States, when any quiestion
respecting them shall assume such a form that the judicial power
is capable of acting on it. That power is capable of acting only
when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights
in the form prescribed by law. It then becomes a case, and the
Constitution declares that the judicial power shall extend to all




There are matters involving public rights which may be pre-
sented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on
them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which
Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts
of the United States, as it may deem proper. Murray v. Land Co.,
18 How. 272; Smith v. Adams, 13o U. S. 167.
The finding or conclusion reached by the Court of Claims, in a
case presented to it, is not enforceable by any process of execution
issuing from the court, nor does the statute establishing this court
make it the final and indisputable basis of action for the other de-
partments of government. The functions of this court are more
in the nature of advisory. The Supreme Court has always been
very reluctant in exercising its judicial power in reviewing decisions
of this court, on an appeal, unless it was empowered to render a
decision which was to be a final and indisputable basis of action by
the parties and not simply ancillary or advisory. Re Sanborn, 148
U. S. 222.
In the present case the Supreme Court, after an examination of
former adjudications on this subject, and being of the opinion that
the proceedings involve a right which in its nature is susceptible of
judicial determination, and also that the Act of Congress conferring
jurisdiction authorizes the rendition of a final, conclusive determina-
tion, hold that the objections urged against its jurisdiction cannot
be maintained and that the act in question is constitutional.
A short summary of the opinion may be stated as follows: That
ihe tribunal awarding the damages dealt only with the two govern-
ments as such, having no relations whatsoever with the claimants;
that no claims could be presented except through the intervention
of the respective governments; that each government, when' it en-
tered into the compact under which the awards were made, relied
on the honor and good faith of the other for protection so far
as possible against frauds and impositions by the individual claim-
ants; that the awards, when paid over, were in strict law the prop-
erty of the United States, and that no claimant could assert or en-
force any interest in it as long as the government withheld it from
distribution; that when the La Abra Company asked the interven-
tion of the United States it did so on the implied condition that it
would act in entire good faith, and that if it should fail in this respect,
it was incumbent upon the government to withhold any sum
awarded; that as between the United States and the company, this
fact was open to inquiry; that an investigation as .to fraud is pecu-
liarly judicial in its nature, and that in ascertaining the facts mate-
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rial in such inquiry, no means are so effectual as those employed by
or in a court- of justice; that the act in question is to be taken as a
recognition, so far as the United States is concerned, of the legal
right of the company to receive the moneys in question, unless it
appeared upon judicial investigation that fraud existed, thereby en-
titling the United States to withhold the same, and that the same
presented a subject for judicial investigation in respect of which the
parties assert rights-the United States insisting upon its rights,
under the principles of international comity, to withhold moneys re-
ceived by it under a treaty, on account of a certain claim presented
through it before the commission organized under that treaty in
the belief, superinduced by the claimant, that it was an honest de-
mand; the claimant insisting upon its absolute legal right under
the treaty and the award of the commission, independently of any
question of fraud, to receive the money, and disputing the right of
the United States upon any grounds to withhold the sum awarded.
SCHOOLS-DISCRIMINATION AGAINST COLORED CHILDREN-RIGHTS
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
In the case of f. N. Cummings et al. v. County Board of Education,
of Richmond County, State of Georgia, reported in 2o Sup. Ct. Rep.
197, the United States Supreme Court sustains the decision of the
Supreme Court of the State of Georgia in refusing to grant an in-
junction restraining the Board of Education from maintaining a
high school for white children only and thereby discriminating
against colored children. The facts were as follows: The School
Board, for economic reasons, as alleged, temporarily suspended the
Colored High School in Augusta, attended by about sixty pupils,
in order, they claimed, that the funds thus saved might be diverted
towards the education in the primary schools of about three hun-
dred children of the same race. The parents of some of the negro
children thus deprived of school privileges, brought suit to restrain
the collecting of so much of the tax as related to the colored high
schools, and to restrain the Board of Education from using any of
said funds for the maintenance of the white high schools. In the
-decision by the Supreme Court, written by Justice Harlan, he says:
"We are not permitted by the evidence in the record to regard
that decision as having been made with any desire or purpose on
the part of the board to discriminate against any of the colored
children of the county on account of their race. The State court
-did not deem the action of the Board of Education in suspending
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temporarily and for economic reasons the high school for colored
children a sufficient reason why the defendant should be restrained
by injunction from maintaining an existing high school for white
children. It rejected the suggestion that the board proceeded in
bad faith or had abused the discretion with which it was invested by
the statute under which it proceeded, or had acted in hostility to
the colored race. Under the circumstances disclosed, we cannot
say that this action of the State court was, within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a denial by the State to the plaintiffs and
to those associated with them of the equal protection of the laws
or of any privileges belonging to them as citizens of the United
States. We may add that while all admit that the benefits and
burdens of public taxation must be shared by citizens without dis-
crimination against any class on account of their race, the education
of the people in schools maintained by state taxation is a matter be-
longing to the respective States, and any interference on the part
of federal authority with the management of such schools cannot
be justified except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard
of rights secured by the supreme law of the land."
In this same connection reference may be had to the recent case
of Elizabeth Cisco v. The School Board of the Borough of Queens, New
York City, decided by the New York Court of Appeals on February
6th, last. Mrs. Cisco's children were sent to the common or public
schools in that borough, but admittance was refused them on ac-
count of their color, and they were ordered to the separate colored
school. She refused to send them there--a plan also adopted by
her husband before his death. Mr. Cisco was twice tried before a
jury and acquitted each time on the charge of violating the Com-
pulsory Education Act, because he refused to send his children to
the colored schools when admittance was denied them to.the white
school. Mrs. Cisco applied for a mandamus to compel the board to
receive her children in the common schools. At special term her
motion was denied, the court following the decision of People ex rel.
King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438. She then appealed to the Court
of Appeals. This court, in sustaining the decision of the lower
court, says: "In this case there is no claim that the relator's chil-
dren were excluded from the common schools of the borough, but
the claim is that they were excluded from one or more particular
schools which they desired to attend, and that they possessed the
legal right to attend these schools, although they were given equal
accommodations and advantages in another and separate school.
We find nothing in the Constitution which deprived the School
COMMENT.
Board of the proper management of the schools in its charge or
from determining where different classes of patrons should be edu-
cated, always providing, however, that the accommodation and fa-
cilities were equal to all."
It will be found upon an examination of the authorities that it is
almost a universal rule that equality of right does not involve the
necessity of educating children of both sexes, or children without
regard to their attainments or age in the same school. Any classi-
fication which preserves substantially equal school advantages does
not impair any rights, and is not prohibited by the Constitution of
the United States. Equality of rights is not necessarily identity of
rights. Berton'neau v. Board of Directors, 3 Woods (U. S.) 177; State
v. McCann, 2I Ohio St. 211. Where no separate schools are pro-
vided it is also generally held that colored pupils cannot be legally
excluded from other schools, and that a writ of mandamus will lie
to compel the school authorities to receive the pupis thus debarred
from educational privileges. State v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342; Knox v.
Board of Education, 45 Kan. 152. At first sight it may appear that
the decision of the United States Supreme Court, above referred to,
is in conflict with this last proposition, but upon an examination of
the case it will be found that this question is not presented, but the
relief asked is an injunction to restrain the use of certain funds for
the maintenance of a high school for white pupils.
